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The view is examined that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of 
fighting behaviour is  for assessment of  relat~ve  KMP (resource  holding 
oower) of  the combatants. Outcomes  ot aggressive  disputes  should be 
decided  by  each  individual's  fitness  budget avaiiltble  for  expenditure 
during a fight (determined  by  the fitness difference between adoption of 
alternative strategies, escalation or withdrawal without escalation) and on 
the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalatil-11  occurs (determined 
by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative 
strategies ("assessments")  will  be  determined by  n,:tural  selection on a 
basis of which ouDonent is likelv to exuend its fitnes  budget first. should 
escalation occur:  his "loser"  ;hould  ietreat (befor.  escalation) and the 
winner  should  stay  in  possession  of  the  resour: J.  Many  aggressive 
decisions depend on whether  one is  a  resource hc  ier, or an attacker. 
Assuming thk RHP  of the combatants to be equal, thi  care many instances 
of fitness pay-off  imbalances between  holder and ai:acker  which should 
weight  the  dis~ute  outcome  in  favour  of  one  or  other  oowonent  bv 
allowing  it  a  greater expendable fitness  budget.  I  ually  thk*weighting 
favours the holder; the attacker therefore needs a c~~rrespondingly  higher 
RHP  before it may be expected to win. This is not inxxiably the case, and 
much observed  data fits the predictions of  this sor.  of  model. If  assess- 
ments  are  perfect  and  budget  expenditure  rates  exactly  predictable, 
then there would never seem to be any case for escaiatlon. Lscalatlon can 
be  explained  In  terms  ot  injury  ~nfl~ctlons  (expenditures)  occurring  as 
discrete events; i.e. as "bouts"  won  or lost  during fighting. As5essrncnt 
can give only a probabilistic prediction of the outcome of a bout. A simple 
model is developed to investigate e\calation situations.  Each combatant 
I  assesses  relat~ve 1  of 
winning the next  bou't '(c,,,).  The stake played  for is infliciion of loss of 
I 
RHP and is determined  by  the fitness budgets of  the opponents. (Each 
individual plays for the withdrawal of its opponei-it.) This defines a critical 
probability of winning (c,,,,)  for each combatant, above which escalation i\ 
1 
e  iavourabie  strstegv  (cab,  . c,.,!,)  and  belo\$  \+.hlch \v~thdrawal  ih  - 
favourable  (c,,,  .  c,:,,).  Escalation  ~hould  occur  only  %here cab,-c,,,, 
is~ic  for both cornbnt:~?~~s  motlet  gives r~redictions  cornpatiblc wit11 rhe observations, indicat~np  that Rl4P loss alone can be  adequate to 
explain \cithdrawal:  escalation  behaviour.  Withdrawal  tendency will  be 
I 
increased  by  low  searching  costs.  Escalations  should  be  restricted  to 
closely matched RHP  opponent1 if RHP  disparity is the major imbalance. 
Outside  the  "escalation  range"  of  a given  individual,  the  higher  RHP 
individual  wins  and  the  lower  one  loses  (i.e.  it  should  withdraw  after 
conventional  display).  RHP disparity  and  holder:  attacker  imbalance 
should both  interact to shape the observed pattern, though their relative  I 
importances  \{,ill  depend  on  species  and  situation.  In some  instances 
selection m:iy  f'ivour  immediate \\i~hdrau.al  from  an  occupied territory 
even  without assessment of  RFIP.  I 
I 
1. Introduction  ! 
There is  much  in  favour of  \,ieu.ing a  great deal  of  animal  behaviour  as 
optimum strategies for maximizing the rate of  extraction  of  "fitness  gain" 
from the available series of "fitness  gain parameters"  (resources) present in 
its  environment.  One  consequence  of  the  occurrence  of  discontinuously 
distributed resources is that they may be in short supply. Animal aggression  , 
(in the form of resource guarding) will be favoured by  selection when there 
are less resources than competitors and where an individual can achieve an 
immediate gain in fitness by forcibly ousting one of its fellows. Jelection  for 
aggression will be more intense the more discrete the resource (i.e. the easier 
it is to guard) and the higher its yield as a fitness gain parameter (a function 
both of its absolute effect and its shortness of supply).  It is  not surprising 
therefore  that  most  of  animal  aeeression  relates  to  food  fighting  and 
G"  u  - 
especially to mating. Territoriality is often merely an adjunct to these two 
situations-e.g.  an area is guarded because  it  has a high probable yield  oi' 
food  or mates,  or both. Figliting  tendency  will  be much modified  by  thc 
probable relatedness of the two competing indiciduals, an effect studied b} 
Hamilton (1  964). 
Darwin (1871) was very well aware of the individual advantages of aggres- 
sion when he founded the theory of sexual selection. Since then it has beconie 
fashionable  anlonzst certain  ecologists  and ethologists to view  aggression 
and territory in terms of advantages it may confer upon groups or species, 
rather than on individuals (see  Wynne-Edwards,  1962). The fact that much 
aggression is ;;ighly I-itualizecl (as displays, pushing contests, etc.) and does 
not involve damage (termed "conventional  fighting"  Maynard Smith, 1972) 
has fuelled "group selectionism"  because it can be argued that an immediate 
advantage would be conferred on any individual which indulged in damaging 
or escalated  fighting.  Group selection  poses  major  problems  in  terms  of 
modern population genetics, and it seems likely to be a very weak selecti~ 
agent  compared  to individual selection  (see Williams,  1971). An excellent 1 - 
I 
i 
i 
I 
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I 
account of the position of fighting in relation to group se!ection  arid individual  I 
?election can be found in Maynard Smith (1972).  , 
Recently  (Maynard Smith, 1972; Maynard  Sinith & Price,  1973) it has 
become abundantly clear that there is no conflict between observed fighting 
strategy and individual selection. Of a number of possible strategies, it can 
be -  shown  -.  .--  that the only one to form an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS- 
1.e. where, if most of the individuals in the population adopt it there is no 
other strategy which  would  give higher  reproductive fitness)  is one where 
il:dlviduals  start  conventionally  but  escalate  to  damaging  fights  later, 
e_specially when  the  oppone1:t  escalates.  These  "limited  war"  strategies 
appear stable against "total  war"  or "total  peace"  strategies when analyzed 
I 
In  relation to game theory. 
In the present paper, fighting strategy is again considered in  relation  to 
individual selection. The view that the "retaliate  if opponent escalates"  will 
initially  form an ESS is accepted.  Further adaptations,  once this strategy 
has stab~hzed,  are examined, in particular the theory that relative strength\ 
of  combatants  are  estimated  dur~ng  displays:  a  suggestion  which  recur\ 
continually In  the literature (see  Ewer,  1968) but which  has attracted very 
I 
I. 
llttle consideration ~n evolutionary terms.  i  I 
,  C 
2..ConventHal Fighting as Assessment of RHP (Resource Holding Power)  1  '2 
J  +- 
/ 
Once "r&tor"  has stabilized as an ESS, any mutant individual able to 
A 
assess  from the conventional  fighting  stage  how  its  own  RHP (resource  I  ..- 
holding power) compares with that of its opponent would have a selective 
advantage, since it could withdraw  without damage when the RHP of its  1: 
opponent exceeds its own by  a sufficiently large amount. It is assumed that  / ,i  -. 
RHP is a measure of  the absolute fighting ability of  a given individual. If 
this character spreads, we may end up  with a "total  peace"  strategy, where all  I 
disputes are settled conventionally. In this case, provided that the charac- 
teristic  of  retaliation  is  not  lost, a  mutant deficient  in  responding  to the 
signals  of  RHP during  conventional  fighting  will  not  spread-it  will  be 
disadvantageous since it will not gain any extra resources and will be beaten 
in  encounters with  individuals  of  higher  RHP.  Thus  our  "conventional 
' 
assessor/retaliator"  becomes the ESS. 
,  It has certain  problems  to face,  however.  irstly.  there  is  the  obvious  c  &  u,,& 
i  difficulty that selection will  immediately favour exaggeration  of  those cues 
1  used to assess RHP. The selective advantage of this form of  "evolut~onary 
cheating"  is  simple: if  (for example) size is  used  as the cue for RHP, then 
I 
where for other reasons it is  disadvantageous to increase absolute size (and 
RHP), whxt  will bc f,~\o~ired  are mcclini~i~rn~  to incre:~qe  apparent sizc (2nd 
T.H.  I i 
I 116  G. .A.  PARKER 
therefor? apparent  RHP). Th;!t  this ha;  happened  often  cecms very likely. 
Tlie canid  threat  posture ill\olves  raisin? the neck hair and standing erectly  I 
(,Darwin, 1871). so does that of many other groups including rodents (Eibl- 
Eibesfeldt,  1970).  Lions  have  m:tnes,  fish  often  raise  fins,  birds  fluff  out 
feathers. Certain species hnve inflatable pouches (e.g. the lizard Phenacosaurus 
richteri: Kisrle.  1963). Examples  are legion.  Another cue very commonly 
used could be weaponry. Much of threat display involves exaggeration and 
\vhici~  are the main defc~~sive  weapons in locusts (Parker, Hayhurst & Bradley, 
I 
display or teeth. antlers, claws (e.p. in crabs; Crane, 1966) or even hind legs, 
1974). It seems quite likely that these features might initially have given good 
indices of RHP. Where there is this type of drive for "evolutionary cheating",  ' 
i 
a counter-selective  compensatory adjustment of  the assessment mechanism  i 
would continually follow in its wake. 
More reliable  measures  of RHP might  be  provided  by  direct  trials  of 
strength between combatants. Pushing and pulling contests, on head andFr 
tail beating clashes abound in  311  groups from fish to ungulates (for many 
classic examples see  Eibl-Elbesfeldt,  1970). Very often conventional fighting 
consists of  combinations of  "unrelial-:s"  display and "reliable"  contests of 
strength, implying that many cues m;iy be used to a-HP.  An  j 
independent analysis has been  made  of  contests &rrying  no inforytion 
of RHP by Maynard Smith (1974). He shows that sele-ainly  , 
favour persistence during displays.  Persistence durations should stabilize at 
' 
3 negative exponential distribution'nsity. 
The present paper mainly concerns contests which provide RHP  information. 
Though  the  "conventional  assessor-retaliator"  theory  ascribes  a  definite 
selective advantqe  to the display behaviour, it poses an alternate problem- 
why do  damaging fights ever occur?  With a nearly perfect assessment mechan- 
ism  one would  predict  escalation  only  where combatants are very  closely 
matched, and there is no clear-cut predictive outcome. We shall consider this 
problem later (section 4) but first  let us consider how assessment might operate 
and whether the simple comparison of RHPs provides a satisfactory solution 
for aggressive behaviour. 
Clearly,  this model  is a  naive one, and certain behavioural  observations 
do  not conform to its prediction. Very often the odds appear heavily weighted 
in favour of the resource holder, and  i~e  absolute RHP  (as  judged by human 
eyes) of  the attacker apparently has to exceed  that of the holder very con- 
siderably before a take-over occurs. ;'here  are several possible  reasons why 
this effect operates : 
(1) Suppose that  the  "resource  structuring"  is  near  perfect; i.e.  by  the 
assorting action of disputes, the popu!ation  is perfectly  truncated with the 
highest RHP individualc occupying all the resources. Jn this case, restructur- EVOLUTION  OF FIGHTING  BEHAVIOUR  227 
ing  can only occur by  inputs and outputs of  competitors  and  resources 
or by changes in RHP  status of individuals in one or both of the two groups 
(holders or non-holders). Here most of the observed disputes would obviously 
be won by the holders. 
(2) The tenure of the resource may \+tell itself  increase RHP, especially 
where the resource is a food source. Also the outcome of a fi911t may involve 
experience of the local environment, hence tenure of the resource may increase 
RHP in th~i  way.  Position  of the holder in  guarding the resource  may be 
\cry  import~nt,  for instance, in  the female-guarding behaviour where  the 
male dings to the female (see Parker, 1974) because the attacker must prix 
the holder off before a take-over can occur. 
(3) Pay-offs may be different for the holder and attacker. Supposing that 
the holder will lose more than the attacker \\ill  gain, ~t might be expected 
that the holder could afford  to sacrifice  more units of fitness in the fights 
than the attacker could afford to expend. Hence where the combatants are 
of  equal  RHP,  the attacker  should  withdraw  because  ~t will  run  out  of 
e.\pendable fighting units before the holder. Hence an attacker must be  of 
h~gher  RHP before it can win. 
The last suggestion causes us to modify our suggestion about the type of 
assessment favoured by selection, and leads to a less naive model. Individuals 
611  be favoured  which  respond  appropriately to the correct  threshold  of 
RHP prediction before they withdraw. This threshold, which will be set by 
evolution, will not be simply "does  his RHP exceed mine?";  rather, it will 
be "given  that his RHP is x and mine y, and that in this situation I have u 
units available to expend and he has b  units, will  I  run  out of expendable 
fitness units before he does?" It will be the probable relative rates at which 
the  combatants  will  expend  fitness  during an interaction which  will  (via 
I  selection)  set  the  appropriate  thresholds  for  withdrawal,  since  this  will 
i  determine which individual  will expend its fighting budget first (and hence 
lose).  We shall consider this  less  naive model  luore fully in  section 4,  but 
first we  shall consider how  pay-ofl's depe1:d  on  \~,hetlic!.  one is a holder or 
/  attacker, and circunistances in which imbalances in pay-offs arise. 
1 
- 
8 
I  "Z 
&Pay-off  Imbalances between 1-lolder and Attackcfi 
1  Let us assume for the present section that we  are considering two average 
individuals  of equal  RHP, and that one has held  a  resource for a  certain 
time (r) before it is encountered by  an attacker. What we wish to estimate 
is the change in fitness sustained by each indi\,idual as a result of a possible 
change in state (i.e. a take-over or a witlidrnwnl). Where the holder's los~  in 
fitness exceeds  the attacker's gain, then the attacker should show1 a Sreater tendency  to  withdraw  becau>e it  will  have  less  fitnesb  urlits  available  to 
expend in the fight. This niodel is compatible \kith an adaptive interpretation 
of motivation. It is suggested that motivational state will be  a function of the 
"fitness  change effect"  achieved by  shifting from one motivational state to 
another. 
Take a very  simple case where a resource can be  extracted at a constant 
rate of gain g fitness units through time  1, summating to g by the end of the 
extraction. The interaction  occurs at time  t  during extraction,  (1 -I)  time 
units before  the resource will  finish. If  there is an escalated fight, the indi- 
viduals will be damaged and the winner's gain rate reduced to w for the rest 
of the time. (This arises mainly because the RHP will have declined, though 
other  reproductive  disadvantages  may  also  have  been  incurred.)  Let  the 
search cost before finding the resource  = s, for the holder and s,  for the 
attacker (these values really summarize the fitness of each individual before 
it encountered the resource). If withdrawal occurs before an escalated fight, 
the withdrawing individual achieves a probable gain rate of p,,  if  it occurs 
after  an escalated  fight,  the  probable  gain  rate  is p,.  We  can  therefore 
summarize all the possible fitness outcomes to each individual  (by the end 
of resource extraction) in the following way: 
Fitness if  fights  Fitness if withdraws without 
damaging fight 
Holder 
Wins :  gr+w(l-t)-sh  (I)  gr+p,(l -f)-s,  (3) 
Loses :  gt+p,(l-  t)-s,  (2) 
Attacker 
Wins  w(1 -2)-sa  (4)  p,(I  -t)-s,  (6) 
Loses :  pW(1  -  tj -  5,  (3 
Suppose that the combatants escalate.  The change in  fitness of  the holder 
if it loses  =Ah  = (1) -  (2) = w(l -  t)  -p,(l  -  t);  and that for the attacker if 
it  wins  =  Aa = (4)- (5) = w(l -  t)  -p,(l  -  t). Hence Ah  = Aa; there is no 
imbalance  in  pay-offs  and  therefore  no  clearcut  predictive  outcome.  If 
motivation  to fight is  proportional  to  All  or Aa,  both  should  be  equally 
motivated. 
We  can  ask  a  second  question: are both  individuals equally motivated 
to withdraw without fighting? Do both experience the same change in fitness 
for the choice between withdrawal without escalation rather than escalating? 
That is,  what is the fitness change  effect due to withdrawing  during con- 
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and for the attacker Aar = (4)/2 +  (5)/2 -  (6),  which is exactly the same value. 
Hence again the pay-offs are equal and there is no clearcut predictive out- 
come; motivations  to withdraw will  be  equaI.  Both these  conclusions are 
intuitively obvious from this simple model where the pay-off remaining after 
the  interaction  is  of  equal  value  to both  combatants.  For  estimates  of 
changes in fitness, it is obvious that the fitness of the individual befare the 
interaction is irrelevant (values s,,  s,,  and gt cancel out). The best estimate 
of a "fitness budget for fighting" is undoubtedly Ahr-  Aar since this considers 
the disparity between  the alternative strategies of  escalate versus  withdraw 
without  escalation.  We  can  now  consider  some  more  realistic  imbalance 
situations. 
(A)  CASE  1 : INVESTMENT OCCURS BEFORE  GAIN; FIXED INVESTMENT  PERIOD 
Many examples of guarding involve a period  of investment (expenditure 
of  fitness) before gain can be  extracted from the guarded resource. Males of 
many  groups show precopulatory  female-guarding  phases untii  the female 
becomes receptive and mates.  These are especially common in crustaceans 
(e.g. Asellus,  Gamnrarus,  Talitvus, Orchestria, Artetnia, and copepods)  and 
in insects (reviewed by Parker, 1970~).  In the vertebrates, a territory or mate 
may often be guarded for some time before any obvious gain can be recog- 
!  nized. A holder can be  said to have entered the gain phase  when  it has a 
1  probability of  offsetting some of  its investment  (e.g. when  it has begun  to 
i  transfer  sperm-so  it will  have  a  probable  fertilization  gain).  Take-over 
!  (when  it  occurs)  usually  happens  during  the  investment  phase,  possibly 
i  because it is generally longer and because take-over is often easier then. 
(a) Suppose that the investment rate is constant. If  take-over  occurs, the 
attacker  simply  supplies  the  remaining  investment  necessary  before  gain 
/  (= that which the holder would have put in after the interaction, had he won). 
1  It can be shown simply analytically after the method above that there is no 
I 
imbalance here; Ah = Aa  and Ahr  = Aar, irrespective of whether take-over 
occurs during investment or gain. This may seem odd because the holder loses 
his existing investment as well as his possible gain. However, the attacker's 
net gain is correspondingly greater because he has to invest correspondingly 
less. Again  the holder's  possible loss = the attacker's  possible gain. 
(b) This will not be true where the investment rate is not constant. Suppose  I 
that if  it won the holder would invest a total ofji  fitness units after the inter- 
action and the attacker would invest a total of ki  units, before gain extraction. 
In this case, Ah -  ha = ki-ji and Allr -bar  = half this value. Clearly, when 
investment  rate  is  highest  at  the  start,  ki  and  the  holder  has  more 
expendable  fitness units. This  is  not  unfeasible for certain  situations, c.g. 
where a territory uiust be elaborately marked and its characteristics learned, or ~i1le1.c  :lc\i:,  I~ILI~L  be ;-cl?ull~~  or fcm~tlcs  re-cour1c.d crc. In the rcvcrse case 
(~nvesrmcnt  rate  increasing  with  time)  then j,  > ki  and  the  odds will  be 
lveighted in favour of the attacker. This is an interesting possibility in cases 
where,  for example, feniale-guarding or territory-holding ineans that males 
are impaired in their feeding activity. If this is so they may lose condition 
(and  increase investment) at ail accelerating rate with time. In the kob, males 
holding TGs (small territories, continually contested, to which the females  1 
come for mating) sustain a higher takeover rate than males on STs (much 
larger  territories,  little  contested,  where  females are reluctant  to mate)- 
probably because food is in very short supply in the TGs (Leuthold,  1966).  1 
This is probably best regarded  as an example of case 4 with j(net gain, g-i) 
-; /;(net  gain, g-i)  because the gain rate (probability of insemination) will  i 
bc constant but the investment rate accelerating.  Note that when g = i, the 
~nale  should leave anyhow, with or without any contest. In locusts there is 
a  precopulatory  female-guarding  phase  and  the  take-over  rate  is  much  1 
higher  during oviposition  than  earlier  in guarding  (Parker,  Hayhurst  &  j 
Bradley,  1974). Oviposition is usually the last stage of guarding investment 
before copulation. It is very difficult, however, to determine whether or not 
this effect results from a decline of absolute RHP, or  merely from the change  1 
in posture during oviposition. 
For arthropod precopulatory guarding phases, it seems very likely that the 
main feature heavily  weighting the odds in favour of  the holder is  that it  i 
initially has a major postural advantage. 
It seems unlikely that the ji  > ki  case could ever exert a major effect. If the 
probability of take-over before gain gets too high then the esisting inirestment 
strategy beconies disadvantageous. This is one of the features which mi:,.  be 
expected  to stabilize  drive  for  invest~llerlt  earlier  and  earlier  before  the 
pay-off  (Parker,  1974);  in  other  words  the ji  :  ki  relationship  can  never 
become heavily ji  > lci biassed because this is  not evolutionary stable. Note 
that this will not apply to  the ji  > ki  case. 
(B)  CASE 2: INVESTMENT OCCURS BEFORE GAIN;  ATTACKER MUST  REINVEST 
Here there is an obvious imbalance in favour of the holder. If we assume 
a roughly constant investment rate summating to i by the end of investment, 
and that the attacker must complete a full i before collc~ting  the gain, we 
find that All-Aa  = it+p,t  and A11r-Aar  = (it+pwt)/2. That is the holder 
has an extra number of expendable fitness units, equivalent to the difference 
between how much more he would have to invest until pay-off (i(l- t)  units) 
and the full investment (i  units), plus the value of searching during the time (t) 
that the attacker is  reinvesting (p,t  units). If the interaction  occurs during 
the gain phase, the imbalance is even greater, simply ifp,  and (i+p,)/2. EVOLUTION OF  FIGHTING BEHAVIOUR  23 1 
This  case  appears  particularly  relevant  to  postcopulatory  guarding  in 
insects (see  Parker,  1970~).  Here the male copulates and then  guards the 
female during oviposition. In the dung fly the sperm transfer phase can really 
be considered the investment phase becausc the last male to ma..  2rtilizes 
most of the eggs (80%) and the female would certainly be quickly rernated if 
left  unguarded  during oviposition. Hence the gain phase is  the pay-off  of 
ensuring precedence of one's ejaculate while eggs are being laid. Here a full 
reinvestment  (full  copulation) occurs if there is a take-over. I11  interactions, 
struggles (escalated fights?) arc rare (about 73;)  and usually the holder wins. 
However,  it is again  difficult  to estimate  the positional  advantage of  the 
holder.  Take-overs are more frequent during oviposition than copulation, 
although this model  would  predict  the opposite,  because the imbalance is 
most favourable to the holder during the gain phase. This effect  certainly 
relates to a relatively greater positional advantage during copulatioc (Parker, 
19706).  Positional  advantage  must  be  minimal  in  the  non-contact  post- 
copulatory guarding phases shown by  many dragonflies,  and thoL.;h  take- 
overs are relatively common, the odds are weighted  in favour of ti;-- holder 
(Jacobs, 1955), as we  would predict. A  full  recopulation  occurs nfrer take- 
over, and guarding continues until the end of oviposition, as in dung flies. 
(c) CASE  3: DAMAGE FROM  FIGHT  PERMANENT; COMBATANTS  DIFFERENT  AGES 
For many prolonged  resource  guarding situations (e.g.  males in certain 
primate troops, lions, and certain ungulates, etc.)  it seems very  likely  that 
the average age of  holders will exceed that of attackers. In this case if the 
combatants fight and the damage persists  to some extent throughout life, 
then it seems likely that the overall fitness of the younger combatant will be 
1  reduced more than that of the older one; it will  have a  longer part of its 
1  reproductive  life  in  the  reduced  RHP condition.  Suppose  that y and  z 
!  represent  the proportions of  reproductive life  spent before the interaction 
by  the holder  and attacker  respectively.  They  have  therefore  (1 -y  and 
(1 -z) left. p, and p,  again represent the gain rates due to searching time in  1  the undamaged  and damaged  states respectively.  We know by the present 
i  analysis that what happens beforehand is irrelevant (i.e. p,p,  p,~)  because it 
i  cannot  alter the  change in  fitness  arising from the interaction.  If  we add 
,  p,(l  -y) to equations (1) and (2) and p,(l -2) to (4) and (5) though Ah  = Aa, 
there  is  a  clear  imbalance  with  Ah- Aar  = p,(I  -p)-pw(l  -  z)  +p,(l  -z) 
I  -p,(l-y).  This example indicates why  Allr-Aur  gives the best  indication 
i 
of disparity in fitness budgets; it takes into account the value of the alternative 
strategy, withdraw,al w~it/lo~(t  escalatioti. If we  signify the difference between 
the attacker's  and  holder's  remaining  reproductive  life  as a  [i.e.  (1 -:)- ,(~I,,C,~,:C-  I,  !OL~II~CI.  I~I~III  the  h~I(i~::-.  I'~LI,  tic  o~!(l,,  :ire  :I~:I~II  \veigl~ted  i~i 
1,1\oi11.  oi' :/,c llc,lticr..  h~~~iuhc  <rt'thc  nlorc di:.astr:,i~s t.ll'ect  ofd;inlage 011  the 
youngi;!.  attacl\er. l'his certainly  fits  observed  data iT we  assume that there 
\vill  2ciie1-ally be  olcier  Iio1dc.i-s ;ind  younger attackers. Note  that there will 
be  no imbalance if the damage does not persist until  the d~ath  of  the older 
I  individual. 
(D) CASE 4: YON-C'ONSTAUT  EXTRACTION  RATE  FROhl  TIME OF START OF 
1 
EXTRACTION 
I  This is the converse of case 2(b). Suppose that if it won the holder would 
extract a total of,j, ftness units af-~sr  the interaction and the attacker would  1 
exiract  k, units.  Here  All-  Aa  = j,-li,,  A/w- Aui. =  (.j,-  k,)]2,  and  so  1 
where j,  > kg  the holder has  the  higher  budget  (i.e.  where  gain  increases 
with time a given individual has been extracting). If the rate of gain is greatest 
at the start (j, < kg),  the attacker has the edge. 
I 
I 
Now, for prolonged guarding as for example in certain feeding territories. 
it seems likely that learning the characteristics of  the resource will increase 
the rate of uptake from the resource.  Hence the remainder of  the resource  ' 
may be worth more to the holder than to the attacker, and so  j,  > kg  and the 
holder wins. However, this will not be true for temporary feeding resources. 
e.g.  food-fighting situations.  It seems highly  likely  here that the first  few 
units of food intake will affect fitness disproportionately more than subsequent 
units.  Thus the value  of  the extractable  remainder  of the resource will  be 
higher to the attacker than to the holder (j, < k,). This time the odds shouici 
be weighted towards the attacker. In many species there is a c1ea:cai  orderin;: 
of feeding with dominant male feeding first, then females, then young. Thi. 
ordering corresponds exactly to the expected absolutc RHPs of the individuals 
-highest  first.  There  is  some  evidence  that  where  tht disparity  between 
RHPs is not so obvious. the "holder  has precedencc"  erect does not appl! 
An example is  the intra-specific food-fighting found in some birds. Orten. 
if it is a single food item that is being contested, there is no obvious precedence 
and the interaction is a mixture of fightins and snatching. We wo111d  predict 
this if  neither individual has yet extracted from the resource and both arc 
equally  hungry  (j, = k,).  Even  more  interesting  is  the case  of  sparrowb 
around pieces of bread (D.  Barnes 8.1  G.  A. Parker, unpublished observations). 
A "holder"  (the hungriest?) guards a!l  or part of the resource some time while 
feeding and giving threat displays to contestants. However, even after a fen- 
pecks the odds become heavily  weighted  in favour  of an attacker-which 
usually takes over the resource for a time until it itself is ousted. The same 
sort of pattern also appears to apply to starlings. Group selectionists would 
probably interpret this as a mechanism which overall gives an even share out EVOLUTrON OF FIGHTING BEH??VIOUR  233 
of  the  resource  to  ali  iilJi\iclual:;  ;~nct  wl~icli t1iercii~r.e Ila:  211 ;lil;ll)li\~ 
advantage  at  the  species  level.  The  individual  selection  interpretation  is 
favoured since it is likely to form the greater selective agent. 
(E)  SUMMARY OF IMBALANCES 
Most  of  the  cases  considered  are very  inadequate for  a  given  natural 
situation,  which  often  consists  of  elaborate  combinations  of  the  above 
effects. Apart  from  the  last  example  (j, < k,),  holders  should  generally 
maintain  tenure  of  their  resources  unless  the  attacker  is  of  sufficiently 
higher  RHP to  offset  the  imbalance.  Predictions  from  holder : attacker 
imbalances appear  to fit observed  data reasonably  well,  suggesting  that a 
combination of  assessment of  absolute RHP (during conventional fighting) 
with  an appropriate imbalance threshold,  could  be  operative in aggressive 
decisions. The model as proposed  so far depends on  an  assessment from 
these  two  parameters  of  the  relative  rates  at  which  each  combatant will 
lose fitness and therefore which will  run out first. Because  there is a single 
"I  will  win-he  will  win"  outcome to this problem,  then  the model based 
on relative  rates of  loss  of  fitness predicts "never  escalate"  for a  perfect 
assessment mechanism. Let us now consider a more realistic model. 
4.  Why Escalate? 
Clearly, if the combatants can predict  exactly their relative  rates of loss 
of  fitness during a  subsequent  damaging fight, they  should  never  escalate. 
This is unrealistic as a model because there will be a strong element of chance 
involved.  Assessment  will  give  only a  probabilistic prediction  of winning, 
not an absolute one. Instead  of  a  precisely  ordered  rate  of  fitness loss, a 
much more valid  description  of  observed  escalatio~?~  v;ould  be  a  series of 
bouts  in  which  either  combatant can  score  an  injury  inflicted  upon  his 
opponent. Injuries will occur as discrete events. Let us now revise the model 
a's follows: 
(1)  As before,  the  function  of conventional  fighting  is  to assess  relative 
:  RHPs. This will  give  an absolute probability  (c,,,)  for each individual to 
win  the first  bout  of  an escalated  fight  (score the  first  illjury  against  his 
i  opponent). 
1  (2) Suppose that the loss in fitness due to an injury in the first bout would 
be I.  For this possible loss, there will  be a critical minimum probability of  !  winning the first bout (rcri,)  below which  retreat (rather than  escalation) is 
!  the more favoilrable strategy. c,,,,  is greater  the greater the search cost for 
an alternative resource. 
(3) Now, only where c,,,,  > c,,,,  for both individuals does e.;c;llntion occur. 
Where  the  siyn  i\  revcr\c<l {'or one.  intii\  i:lt~:\l.  it  rctri.;it\  I-;ither th:~n  hc 23-4  C;.  .4.  P411KLR  I 
d:tmngcc!.  iV1lcr.c  [he .,jg!l  i,.  rcterizii  for l,k>111.  11-!c'  iii~;;:er is  the one with 
the Lesber  negatiie ~COSC;  II i:ill  ;!ll'~'ii!  to  [~L,I.-I>~  :~I~~IOLII  ~'\c;~I;::ion  longer.  i 
(4)  Should escalation occur. a reasbessmcnt should occur immediately after 
the end of the first bout (tirst injury) because the  KHP of the loser will have 
decreased and so will its c,,,  for the next bout (also c,,,  for the winner has 
actually increa~ed).  Thus the chance that withdrawal (before the next bout)  I 
will  be  advantageous  to the  loser  is  likely  to be  considerably  increased,  i 
depending on I (greater I,  greater  the probability  that withdrawal  will  be 
favourable before the next bout). It is a common feature of damaging fights 
i 
that  as  soon  as  :1  combatant  sustc~ins  an obvious  injury,  it  retreats;  an  j 
observation which fits the model. 
(5)  The "game.'  being played is that of reversing the opponent's cab,  > cCri,  ' 
to become  c;,,,  < c,,,,; i.e. playing  for the withdrawal of one's  opponent. 
Thus fighting in disputes over resources is regarded  as a form of resource 
assessment strategy in that the probable gain from a given resource is weighed 
' 
against the probable search cost for an alternative. In the present case the  I 
withdrawal point is defined by the changing nature of probability of winning  : 
and its cost, measured against the cost of  withdrawal for searching for an 
alternative resource (i.e. one which is unguarded or has a holder with a lower 
RHP, more favourable to attack). 
It is interesting to attempt a quantification of the above model to examine 
its characteristics. A  rigorous examination becomes extremely complex,  SO 
only a first order approximation will be attempted here. Evolution's job ia in 
a  sense a much simpler  one-selection  merely favours individuals showing 
the  optimum withdrawa1,'escalate  thresholds,  out of a  series of "threshold 
variants".  Let  us  assume a  normal distribution of  RHP in  the competing 
population, so that frcq~~encies  of individuals in relation to RHP  will therefore 
be summarized by: 
where the variable r = RHP, o = standard deviation  and  = mean RHP 
for  the  competitors.  Integrating  thib  distribution  between  r = 0  and  r, 
(I., is 3 $\en  RHP individual be~ng  considered) we  get 
which  gives  the proportion  of  the competing population  with  an absolute 
RHP below r, if we  set F(r,)  = I  .O.  F(,;)  can be calculated from tables of 
integrals of variable  *G  ' [nits of the normal distribution. 
Consider an individual without  a  resource searching in a locality where 
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tion. The time taken to collie across a resource held by an  individual of lower 
RHP  will be on average tiF(r.,), where t = the mean time between successive 
encounters of different  resources.  Obviously, where t is low relative  to the 
I.esource life,  an "imper~:.:t  structuring"  of  the  resources  (resources held 
randomly) cannot persist; there will be a change towards "perfect structuring" 
(resources held by truncatcri top end of RHP distribution) at a rate inversely 
related to t. To  make a gross simplification, we could assume that a propor- 
tion  s  of the resources  arc perfectly  structured, and that  (1 -s)  are held 
randomly. There are many Inore competitors than resources. A  less  naive 
approach (e.g. where there is an increase in the average level of  structuring 
with encounters through  resource life) is coniplex and is not justified  until 
other aspects of the model are also elaborated. All that is required of s:  (1  -s) 
is that it gives an approximate index  of  structuring so that we  can assess 
roughly how long it will t:lke  a given individual to find  a takeable resource. 
For the present model  we  will  assume that  no holder: attacker imbalance 
operates, other than disparity in RHP. 
(A)  VALUE OF SEARCH TIME IF WITHDRAW WITHOUT FIGHTING 
We shall assume that the advantage of high  RHP is related to the lower 
search time to find  a  resource, and that a  "takeable"  resource  (from  the 
viewpoint  of  estimating  the  value  of  search time)  is  simply one occupied 
by an individual of lower RHP. This is obviously a reasonable approxinlation 
only when the range of  opponent RHP which will result in escalation with 
a given searcher (the "esca!;ition  rangew-see  later) is narrow. On average a 
searcher will  come across a  lower RHP holder  once in every t/F(r,)(l  -s) 
time  units from the non-structured  resources,  i.e.  t/F(r,)  x 1 /(1 -  s). Of all 
structured  resources,  a  proportion  [F(r,)-(I  -s)]/s  will  be  occupied  by 
lower  RHP individuals.  Hence  the  time  to  take  a  "structured"  resource 
i  willbe: 
)  If F(r,)-(1  -s)  is  negative, the value is taken as 0 (none of  the structured 
resources held by lower RHP individuals). 
Now, in one (long) time unit of searching, the total encounters of takeable 
1  resources is therefore 
Thus the mean  search tlmc  taken to find  '1  resourze  held  by a lower  KHP 
individual w1l1 be the reciprocal of this talue (i.e. total trmc dl~lded  by total ,,  -.  xi:  t  ,  \  I' <\  I<  I,  ! 1.:  I 
iru~~iui  c!lcouilLcis.  dlid  jic;lse  ths o\,crail gain  sate for a  ga~ii  G  with gain 
estractic>~l  time 11 
(R)  PROBARILITY  OF WINNING .\  BOUT IF ESCALATE  1 
In a bout between  any two given combatants the probability  of  winning  : 
(c,,,)  will  be  assumed  to  be  directly  proportional  to the relation  between 
their RHPs. For individual .u fighting J;  this is r,/(r,+r,).  ! 
I 
(c)  FITNESS BCI>GETS FOR  FIGHTING  1 
A  withdrawal point in resource assessment strategy is set by  the stage in 
investment where  I 
I 
(a)  (b) 
Probable future fitness  Probable future fitness 
gain rate due to continued  gain rate due to withdrawal 
investment in the resource  =  for resumption of searching 
(in gain extraction, fighting,  for an alternative resource. 
courtship persistence, etc.) 
(see Parker, 1974). Obviously the optimum strategy is to continue investment 
when (a) > (b), but to withdraw when  the sign is reversed. The theoretical 
withdrawal  point for each combatant depends on how much fitness it can 
afford to lose (during fighting) before withdrawal becomes the favourable 
strategy; i.e. on its "fitness budpet"  for fighting. For the present analysis, we 
shall measure fitness loss entirely in terms of reduction in RHP; the actual 
fitness loss will  be greater than this for a variety of reasons, but (especially 
for sexually selecred fighting) RHP  loss may often form the major component. 
(The model to be developed can be modified quite simply to include, say, an 
increased probability of mortality as a result of fight damage; however, it is 
interesting to examine whether RHP  loss on its own can account for observed 
behaviour). We shall consider the effect of a loss 1 in  RHP. Hence an indi- 
vidual of RHP  r.,  falls to RHP = r,-I  if it loses a bout of escalated fighting. 
Now, the winner will gain from the resource at a rate Glh. When he leaves 
the resource (after extraction is complete), the value of search time is equiva- 
lent to (7). For the loser, the search time gain rate will be reduced to LVOLU  TION OF I~ICiti~TINC;  BLliAVIOUR  23  7 
Supposing that loss I persists for time 11,  and then the individual recovers to 
RHP r,.  For each  combatant,  the  fitness  budget  (maximum  permissible 
loss I)  call now be calculated roughly as: 
(a)  (b) 
cabS(hG/h  +(n -  11)(7)}  +(  1 -  ca,,)n(8)  =  11( 7)  (gal 
for the condition where 11  > 11,  the evaluation  ib roughly: 
(a)  (b) 
cabShG/h  +(1 -  cab,){n(8)  +(h -  n)(7))  =  N7)  (9b) 
In (9a) and (9b) above, the parts (a) and (b) correspond quantitatively  to 
(a) and (b) in the descriptive equation for withdrawal point. 
(D)  CALCULATION  01'  CCrit:  WHEN SHOULD ESCALATION OCCUR? 
We can make a major si~nplification  if  we eilsure that the model operates 
as a "one  step game",  i.e.  there is a definite solution after one bout-the 
loser withdraws. This can  be done by  adjusting the stake played for by the 
combatants. We can find  the minimum value of  1 in  a combat which  will 
ensure that the lower will withdraw. 
We know that the withdrawal point at any stage in the interaction is set 
by (9a) and (9b). Stake 1 is determined as fc~llows.  Assume a given individual 
loses at the first bout. On reassessment  of  c,,,,  (cabs  for the second bout), 
will it fight for a further bout assuming that the stake played for will be the 
same as in the first bout (i.e. escalation iq maintained at the same level)? A 
I  second bout will be favourable if 
1  where n > /I, or if 
i  for the condition  11  < 11. The value of  cCrit  above follows from substituting 
)  cCrit2  for cabs  in (Ya) or (9b). Thus by ~~pplyiilg  a range of values for I in (loo) 
l 
or (lob) we  can plot  cCritz  against I.  The intercept  of  this curve with  one 
for cabs?  against  1 gives  the minimum  injury  (I,,,,)  which  will  ensure with- 
drawal if  the individual loses the first  bout (i.e. where  cab,z = cCrit2).  We 
!  calculate two stakes,  one for eac!~  combatant. and u5e  the higher  value to 
determine whether or not escalation should  ozcur aftel- a  period  of  "con- 
ventional  assessment".  Escalation  should  occur  only  when  cabs,  -cCri,,  is 
positive  for both opponents; cCrit,  is calculated from ( IOa) or (105) above 
using the higher value for !,,,,  a5 the .,take this tiriie for both opponents for 
the jrst bout. -1-i:c  ;il~cr\i' pi-(:~i'J~i~-c  jot- c!cc~~ii~lg  111~  stahc /,,11  I\  !ly  no means as arbitrary 
as it may at  firct appear. It relies entirely  on  the tdative fitness budgets of 
thc two opponeniu: and ifltcgral  part of the proposed model. It assumes that 
each  combatant  is  playil~g  for the  retreat  of  its  opponent and  that  this 
demands the infliction  of  a ccrtain  critical  level  of  injury.  It also assumes 
that the level of  escalation necessary (higher I,,,,)  to ensure the withdrawal 
of  one's  opponent renders oneself vulnerable to the same possible  danger. 
The opponent ~vith  the  lower fitness budget  must  rlay for a  higher stake 
than would  be  necessary to ensure his own withdrawal if  he lost; this auto- 
n~atically  escalates the fight to the same level for both opponents. 
(E)  SOME PRCDICrIONS OF THE MODEL  1 
Obviously  ehcalation  tendency  will  be  inversely  related  to  damage cost. 
Where  the effects of  damage persist  less  thdn  the encounter time  (n < t), 
damage  costs  nothing  in  the  present  model  because  the  loser  will  have  1 
recovered  before  the next resource is encountered.  Hence RHP loss as the  ij 
sole fitness cost of fighting damage can operate only where n > t. Note that 
in (9) and (10) n is used to apportion relative loss; this is used in conjunction  1 
with extraction time h to relate all situations to the same time  base (when 
n > h we  use overall time base n, and vice versa). However, the model is to  ,{ 
some extent "buffered"  agalnst relative differences in  r,  h, and n because of  B 
the means of determining I,,,,--the  stake played for.  % 
The effects of  different levels of  RHP disparity between extremes of the  , 
population  are  difficult  to  estimate  accurately  from  the  present  model 
because of  the assumption that  the value of search time can  be  estimated 
directly from the proportion  of  resources  held  by  lower  RHP individuals. 
Clearly, however, the less the extent of  RHP disparity across the competitor 
population,  the  closer  the  cab, values  for  combatants and  the  closer  the 
c,,,, values (because  there  will  be  less search time  disparity  if the value  of 
search time is only weakly influenced by  RHP disparity).  From the results 
obtained  below,  this  might  be  expected  to result  in  a  wider  "escalation 
range"  (see below). 
Most animal confl~ct  lnvolves  relatively little escalation  and much con- 
ventional display, implying that the cost of damage and the degree of RHP 
disparity are both higher rather than lower, so that withdrawal is commonly 
the  favourable  strategy.  An  experimental  computation  was  investigated 
using  r  = 0.1,  h = 1,  iz  = 10,  G = 1; c,,,,  calculated  after  (10a).  This 
ranking should give a moderately high incentive for withdrawal (search time 
short, damage prolonged). Because h = lot and the number of competitors 
is assumed to be considerably in excess of the number of resources, then s 
might be expected to be fairly high and was taken as 0.7. RHP was arranged EVOLUTION OF FIGHTING  REHAVlOUR  239 
so  that  r = a  (standard  deviation)  and where  the  mean  p = 20.  Hence 
r, = 1 for a low ranking individual -  1~  below  the mean, and r, = 3 for 
a high ranker + lo above the mean. A combat between two such individuals 
gives c,,,  values of 0.25 and 0.75 respectively; a moderate disparity. We shall 
consider  the optimum  strategy  (escalate or withdraw)  of  a  low,  medium, 
and  a  high  ranker  (r.,  = 1,  3, 3  respectively)  in combats \vith  a  range  of 
opponents within  T20 of the mean, and also consider the optimum strategy 
for the opponent. 
Results are shown in  Fig.  1.  Each combatant shows a relatively  narrow 
"escalation  range"  (range of  RHP opponents  for  which  both  individuals 
FIG.  1. Outcome of aggrestivs encounters of vario~~s  combinations of RF1P combatants 
using the rnodel  described  in section  4  with  t  -= 0.1.  Ir  --  1.0,  rr  -  10,  G -  1,  s .-  0.7. 
r  -=  0,  p = 20.  and solid lines = c  ,,,,  -  c ,,,,  for combatants of r.,  -= I  (a), r-, -  2 -  11 
(b), r, = 3 (c);  1;)  and dotted lines -  c.,,,, -  c,,!:  for range of opponents between  1.1  :.- 0.2 
to 3.5 (abscissa) fighting each of  these three conlbatancs. In a fight the individual with  the 
highest score for c:,,,, -  c,,..  st~tys  in  possession of the resource and the loser withdraws. 
except where both opponents have potiti\,e  score.? in which use  there is escalated fighting 
to determine  the winner. Shaded zones -  e?c:~lntion range.  (ranges of  opponent  KHPs 
which will result  in esc~latiori  witti  e:tcli  ~)l'  rllc tl1rc.c cnrnb;ttLinr\  considered). 
show  a  posit~ve  kalue  f'or  r.,,,,-c,,,,).  Out51dc this  range  the  f'i~ou~able 
strategy is wlthdra~ial  for  the lol,tcr RHP  ~nd~\  ]dual and generally escalation 
1  for the higher one  Howc\er, both the low and medium rankers show with- 
/ 
drawal as the favourable strategy for both combatant5 \\lien the opponent has 
r, = 1.5. Because F(I  ,)  1,  sgmo~dal  w~th  the rn,lulrnunl gradient at the mean,  '  a unit drop In  Y, affects nn  abcrdge RHP ~ndi~idual  more than an eutrerne 
one (the number of takeable resoulces falls more)  Hence the relnt~on  bethieen 
1 and c,,,,,  14 steeper the closer to the 1ne:in  RHP In FI~  I(b) the I, -  1  5 
opponent has a higher fitne\\ budget (/,,,,I tli:in  the I., = 9 combatant, ckcn accounilns  !'(\I-  rtlc ~IiIkrcncc  ill  (.,,,,;  Iio\!c\cr..  c,,~,  > (.,,>,  fhr  both  indi- 
i.icJun1.i.  Tnr Fry.  \(:I).  though  thc I,.,,, f'or  r,  = 1.5 is  higher than that for 
I.,  -7  I, i:  (.,,b, \;I[LIC  is still too IOLV  to allo:\  c~;cala(iori.  These ef'iects probably 
arise because I'or  3 short range of  RHP clobe to the mean. the  is greater 
for the theoretical bout  7 than for. bout  1  because the RHP disparity does 
not fully offset the effect of  the steeper F(I.,) gradient. Note, however, that 
the higher RHP individual  still "wins"  in such cases (has less motivation to 
withdraw and can afford to be more persistent in conventional display). 
The model also indicates a wider escalation range  with the high ranking 
combatant [Fig.  I(c)]. Because of  the steeper gradient in  F(r,) at the mean 
one might expect  a  narrower  escalation  range  there than at the extremes. 
However, the escalation range of the low ranker is even smaller than that of 
the average  one. This is  probably  becal~se  c,,,  disparity  increases towards 
r,  = 0; obviously  the disparity  is  greater  between  r.,  = 0.3 and 0.5 than 
between  I.,  = 3.3 and 3.5. 
5. Discussion 
In summary,  the  main  predictions  of  the  type  of    nod el  developed  in 
section 4 are that there should be an escalation range of closely matched 
combatants and that on either side of  the range for a given individual, the 
h@er  ranking opponent should usua!ly  be prepared to  escalate and the lower 
one towithdraw. Much fighting follous this pattern. Size, strength, weaponry, 
and c~perierice  all seem involved in  RHP. There are innumerable examples 
where the outcome of disputes depends to a large extent on the relative size 
of  the opponents. Fur instance, largc individuals dominate over small ones 
in green  sunfish  (Greenber~,  1947; Hale,  1956), crayfish  (Bovbjerg,  1953, 
1956), mice (Ginsberg & Allee,  1942), New Forest ponies (Tyler, 1972) and 
a host of other species. Match?d individuals often show the greatest tendency 
for escalation; mirror  irnayes  are often  very  effective  stimuli (e.g.  Figler. 
1972). Though pushing contests are apparently comnionp!ace  as estimates of 
relative  strengths,  there are several  examples ivhere visual cues or physio- 
logical ones are used as indicators of wealter individuals. Chickens which are 
moulting (and  hence  likely  to be  weaker)  are usually submissive (Collias, 
1943); crayfish avoid combat until the cuticle has hardened after moulting- 
newly-moulted  specimens are less  mobile and sustain greater damage and 
risk si  a result of fights (Bovbjerg, 1953). Antler and horn size appear to be 
judged directly in many deer and sheep and fights occur only between closelj 
matched  combatants  (see  Eibl-Eibesfeldt,  1970);  there  seems  little  doubt 
from the literature that assessment of  RHP is  occurring in  most cases of EVOLUTION OF FIGHTING BEHAVIOUK  24 1 
animal combat. To avoid any implications of teleology, it must be stated that 
"assessment"  in  this  context  means  only  that  the  individual  responds 
differentially to opponents on a basis of their RHP relative to its own; the 
only assessment of what is the appropriate response is  the unconscious one 
performed by selection. 
It is  interesting  that  during  a  display,  selection  should  mainly  favour 
=enting  an opponent with a maximal  impression  of one's  RHP. Until  a 
"strategic  decision"  is reached,  no information  should  be  displayed  to an 
opponent concerning withdrawal intentions, since there is the possibility that 
the  opponent  may  withdraw  first  (see  Maynard  Smith,  1974).  In  B~ttrr 
splendens various display components increase in parallel for several minutes, 
and  an  outcome  is  not  predictable  until  one  individual  finally  gives  up 
(Simpson,  1968).  For  a  given  action  of  the  opponents, there  may  be  an 
optimal retaliatory action. For food fights of blue tits Stokes (1962) has shown 
that correlations between  display components and the subsequent outcome 
(attack,  escape,  stay)  are  sometimes  significant,  but  not  generally  high. 
Hinde (1972) has argued  that this may be interpreted  on the view  that the 
next action of the displaying individual is not predetermined  but dependent 
on the behaviour of the opponent. 
Prior conditioning  and  experience can  also be  very  important in  deter- 
mining the outcome of aggressive disputes. In some cases this is related to 
the holder:  attacker imbalances mentioned  in  section  3, where the holder 
has  a higher  fitness budget  than the attacker for reasons other than mere 
RHP disparity. However in some cases it seems likely that successful fighting 
experience markedly increases the readiness for escalation  (e.g.  in mice and 
1  rats, Scott & Fredericson, 1951); an effect explicable in terms of experience 
increasing RHP. 
Males  are  usually  dominant  over  females.  This  often  relates  to  RHP 
disparity  because  males  are bigger;  in  some  instances  however  secondary 
sexual characters  are used  as signals  [e.g. comb size  is  a  determinant of 
dominance in  chickens  (Collias,  1943)]. It seems posslble  that  because  of 
sexual selection male fitness may be increased by  adopting a more dangerous 
strategy if this gives an overall increase insemlnation rate. Thus males of the 
same F$HP  as females may  have  a higher  fitness budget  for fighting over,  -- -- 
say, food-because  being  in  peak  condition  may  affect  male  fitness more 
because of intra-sexual competition (see Trivers, 1973, for a similar argument  ---- 
concerning male mortality). It IS Interesting in  this context that females with 
young often (but not always) increase markedly  In rank. They may have a 
higher fitness budget in such circumstances. 
Prevention of damage during retreat is a common adaptation. Fish colour 
changes which accompany submission and retreat can often be explained on (,.  A.  PAKKFR 
a basis  of  crypsis. A  trapped retreater (presumably cab, < c,,;,) when faced 
with  a  potential  escalator  (prcsumably  c:,,,  > c,,,,)  is often  very frantic in  , 
its attempts to escape (e.g. Sabine, 1949). 
Much  of  RHP  disparity  must  be  environmental,  due  to  experience, 
nutrition effects during dsvelopment, accidental damage, etc. In insects adult 
size variation is very largely environmental in origin; if  size is important in 
combats the main  selective force acts on choice of  oviposition site  by  the 
female (Prof. H. E. Hinton, personal communication). Selection will ravour  I 
RHP increase  until  this  is  countered  by  opposing  pressures;  for  sexual 
selection the selection coefficient of a competitively advantageous character 
actually  accelerates  as  the  character  spreads  throughout  the  population 
(Charlesworth & Charlesworth, in press). 
If  RHP variance  IS small, holder : attacker imbalances may be the main 
I 
factors determining thc outcome of aggressive disputes, and vice versa when 
RHP disparity is large and holder : attacker imbalances small. It is interest- 
l  ing that withitl social groups RHP disparity seems to be the main determinant 
of  aggression  and  doininancr  rank.  This fits  the predictions  because  it is 
unlikely  that  (possibly  fooa-fighting  apart)  holder :  attacker  imbalances 
will  be  of  major  importance  within  groups.  The opposite may prevail  for  1 
P.  many  between  group (or single individual)  territorial  situations; probably 
t. 
I 
mainly because of the considerable reinvestment imbalances of the type dis- 
k  cussed  in case  I(b) and case 2, section 3. A fascinating effect is predictable  .) 
r  here. Where the holder : attacker imbalances are high, the RHP disparities 
r 
r  small, and the value  of  search  time  high  (e.g.  if  alternative  territories  are 
E  relatively abundant), it seems possible that RHP assessment need not occur 
before  withdrawal  is  favourable; mere signs that the territory  is occupied 
may be enough to favour retreat for further searching. This may well be the 
explanation of territory-marking scents, songs and visual cues which appear 
to give little indicatron  of RHP. Baker (1972) gives an excellent discussion 
and  evidence  for  this  sort  of  effect  in  the  territorial  behaviour  of  male 
nymphalid butterflies. For instance, in Aglais urticae searching males become 
less reluctant  to sh~re  occupied  territories  as the afternoon wears  on (and 
the chances of finding an unoccupied territory become reduced). 
The models developed  in  .he present  paper have many inadequacies. In 
section 4 we  h:~i,e  not considered  how  RHP will  modify  tenure-time  of  a 
resource because of  its relatlon  with  the chances of  take-over. Nor do we 
have  an accurate nswssment  of  the value  of  search time; nor is the exact 
relationship between  r, /I  and  s properly explored. Though the mere Ioss of 
RHP alone is adequate to explain much of observed behaviour, it would be 
interesting  to examine  the  interaction  of  RHP loss  with  other  possible  ! 
sources  of  fitness loss  through  damage. A  much  more  rigorous  analysis, EVOLUTION OF FlGkl TINC;  BEHAVIOUR  243 
though very complex, might allow a more exact set of predictions and enable 
quantitative consideration of real data. 
Perhaps the implications of assessment strategy for human aggression are 
better left for a future occasion. 
I am deeply indebted to Prof. J. Maynard Smith for his criticisms and for kindly 
showing me a copy of his article (1974). 1  should like especially to thank Dr  R. A. 
Stuart for his discussion and help i\ith the model in section 4, and Dr R. R. Baker 
with whom I have discussed this topic often over the past decadc. I an1 also grateful 
to Mrs A. Bedford for searching out some of the references and to Miss S. Scott 
and Miss D. S. Paterson who typed the manuscript. 
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